Corruption in procurement

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• In Australia procurement is about 35% of government expenditure

• In OECD countries one third of Govt. procurement is by central government, two thirds by sub-national governments (OECD average)

• In Europe about €120 billion is lost to procurement corruption each year (EC)
Red flags

• Bidding process
• Choosing preferred supplier
• Paying for goods and services
• Delivery of goods and services
• Contract management
Corruption types in procurement

• Bribes
• Rigging pre-tender conditions
• Rigging project scope and requirements
• Rigging bids
• Rigging selection process
• Submitting or approving false invoices
• Managing project with great laxity or corruptly
• Using specialised knowledge to shape procurement
• Creating conditions for a particular vendor
• Delivering inferior product
• Cartel behaviour
• Pay to play
• Worming the system
Activity context

- No laws or regulations
- Weak laws or regulations
- Good laws or regulations that are circumvented
- Self dealing
- Trusted individual acting alone
- Initiated by public servant
- Initiated outside public service
- Group dynamics
- No public service involvement at all
Procurement Types

• Standard
• Customised
• Intangible
• Complex
• Incomparable
Standard

Items that can be benchmarked easily

• Pencils
• Laptops
• Vehicles
  etc

Corruption risks

• Tailoring supplier eligibility criteria
• Favouring certain suppliers
• False invoices
• Inferior substitution
• Undersupplying quantities
• Post supply servicing
• Fixed v variable contracts
Customised

Standard products adapted for special purposes

• special IT systems;
• police or ambulance vehicles;
• health or human services
• Training
• Debt collection
  etc

Corruption risks

• Unrealistic specifications that favour only one supplier
• Provider can bamboozle public servant with unique offerings and inflate price, excess of which can be shared
• Supervisor difficulties
• Inadequate specifications can allow supplier interpretations

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Intangible

Product that cannot easily be measured and deliverables not standardised

• Consultancy services
• Research activities
• Legal services
• Intellectual property etc

Corruption risk

• Favouring particular consultants
• Contriving consultancies about unimportant things, or things which could be done in-house
• Inflating consultancy/research prices
• Incompetent/absent supervision

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Complex items that require expertise managing different professions and processes

- Major infrastructure projects e.g. roads, ports, airports, urban renewal

Corruption risks

- “road to nowhere”
- Bid rigging
- Cartel behaviour
- Supervision difficulties
- Delayed rewards (ex minister joins board)
- Political and infrastructure goals differ
All procurement types (1)

• Shaping criteria for eligible bidders

• Providing information inconsistently or selectively

• Allowing (non-transparent) late submissions

• Manipulating assessment criteria for tenders
• Scoring bids subjectively or unfairly
• Ignoring or abusing standard procurement rules and processes
• Significantly changing terms of contract after it has been awarded
Since 1988 NSW ICAC has held about 172 hearings
  – 23% were procurement related

Of these two thirds fell within three sectors
  – Transport 26%
  – Education 19%
  – Local government 17%
In three quarters of cases initiator was a public servant; In one quarter, a private person/company

Three quarters were “lone wolf” public service perpetrators; One quarter in conjunction with others

Three quarters (76%) involved a senior public servant only; One sixth (16%) had senior and junior public servants involved. (Remainder unclear)
### Most common behaviours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behaviour</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issuing and/or approving fraudulent invoices, false receipts, dummy quotes and/or certifying or falsifying documents for assumed legitimate purposes</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disclosing commercially confidential information to private companies owned by preferred contractors (or themselves/relatives) and/or helping contractors with their bids/tenders.</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealing undersupply and/or keeping quiet while preferred contractors overcharged department</td>
<td>9%</td>
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Benefits

• The individual benefits financially

• The individual does not benefit financially, but receives gifts and other perks (that they would not otherwise buy)

• The individual does not benefit immediately but sets up something for later

• The individual does not benefit at all, but does it for the company or for a cause
Losses

• Less than $100,000 16%
• 100,000 to $1 million 40%
• $1m to $5m 26%

• Almost one third of the cases involved no clear bribe or kickback to the public official. These involved steering contracts and work to friends, associates or families

• Some people became romantically involved, and misused their position to impress or benefit their prospective partner or their partner’s family
Opportunity structure

• motivated offender,

• a target

• absence of a capable guardian.
Guardianship 1 (trust)

• Three quarters involved senior officials who were trusted by colleagues and subordinates

• Corruptors were 'entrusted' officials who were often given absolute control and delegation over key procurement processes. The lack of active checks and balances on daily operations provided an opportunity for corruption.
• Lack of leadership often resulted in a dominant organisational culture within which public accountability was not valued.

• Confusion and lack of organisational clarity and purpose, as well as inadequate rules and guidelines, created opportunities.

• Leadership failures were apparent where experiences and lessons from earlier corruption investigations were ignored.
Guardianship 3
(conflict of interest)

• Private business arrangements of public servants

• Rent seeking by powerful and sophisticated outsiders, and conflict of interest internally

• Whistleblower protection
Opportunities

System failure
Lack of adequate rules

- Insufficient rules
- Insufficient processes
- Insufficient checks and balances
- Insufficient knowledge

System weakness – failure to apply existing rules

- Insufficient monitoring
- Bypassing rules
- Failure to meet organisational responsibilities
- Weak culture
Slippage points

- Culture
- Due Process
- Temptation
- Managerial incompetence/wilful disregard
  (Dobel)

Analysis of slippage

- Conditions
- Processes
- Detection
- Prevention

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## Slippage example

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<tr>
<td><strong>Due Process</strong></td>
<td>&quot;anything goes&quot; attitude</td>
<td>No regard for conflict of interest</td>
<td>exposure and prosecution</td>
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<td><strong>Temptation / easy benefits</strong></td>
<td>valuable contracts and equipment</td>
<td>Manipulation of processes for gain</td>
<td>ICAC</td>
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<td><strong>Managerial incompetence / wilful disregard</strong></td>
<td>management unaware/ felt they were above scrutiny/ Inbred and tired</td>
<td>Processes violated with impunity</td>
<td>Regulation audit did not detect; external audit discovered breaches</td>
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Responses

• Identify slippage points
• Appropriate oversight and compliance
• Strengthen culture of integrity
• Tailor to risk profile and nature of agency

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Risks?

• What if government gets it wrong?

• Should contractors assist in, or determine specifications?

• How much discretion for negotiators?
Setting the framework

• Trust
• Accountability
• Conflict of interest
Thank you

Any questions?

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